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Math and Science Education
I would like to expand a little on Lauren B. Resnick’s article “Mathematics and science learning: A
new conception” (29 Apr., p. 477) on the basis of my
own experience teaching geophysics at the university
level. Geophysics is a field in which the qualitative
aspects of science that she discusses are perhaps
more obvious and accessible than in older, more precise disciplines, such as physics. My 8 years of teaching have taught me that my two greatest challenges
are students’ inexperience with problem solving and
with verbal expression of a scientific problem. I see
these as closely related and as a symptom of the
broader deficiencies in literacy and numeracy in students today.
The first deficiency, inexperience with problemsolving, is manifest in the persistent tendency to grab
the nearest formula and start substituting numbers
without first considering its relevance to the problem
at hand. At a more advanced level, it is manifest in a
reluctance to do first some “back-of-the-envelope”
estimates before launching into a calculation that may
be more elaborate than the problem demands. The
engineering and physics majors in my classes, evidently having been drilled in applied mathematics
methods, are more prone to this. It is also a widespread tendency in the research literature (and is
probably abetted, in this context, by the desire to impress the audience with mathematical machismo).
This much accords closely with Resnick’s comments;
in more old-fashioned terms, we might say that these
students have not been forced to think enough about
their scientific problems.
The second deficiency, in verbal expression, goes
further. In order that my students appreciate the observational and logical basis of scientific inferences, I
have had them write brief essays defending some
hypothesis (for example, that the earth has a liquid
metallic core). While most students have learned to
do these reasonably well, it has usually been their
first experience of such writing, and the shortcomings

of a few have been illuminating. Some do not have a
clear understanding of the difference between theory
and evidence: cause and effect are confused. Many
have difficulty organizing the material, and often the
writing is wordy. The worst cases (these are college
juniors and seniors) are essentially illiterate: their
writing is ungrammatical and totally disorganized,
although many of the relevant words and phrases
might be present. I have concluded that these students
have not been forced to think much about anything,
be it science, history, or poetry. (Nevertheless, they
often go on to graduate.)
I strongly agree with Resnick’s suggestion that
“teaching has to focus [more] on the qualitative aspects of scientific and mathematical problem situations” (my insertion). It is tempting in science classes
to try to race through all of the topics that might be
included in a given subject, but it is much better instead to be selective and to go carefully over the relevant observations and the comparison of these with
deductions from various hypotheses. Quantitative
problems may give practice only in the deductive
phase of science; writing assignments expose students to the inductive phase and to the winnowing of
rival hypotheses.
We might even find that, with more emphasis on
qualitative aspects of science, the gulf between the
“two cultures” will disappear. Scientists and engineers might become more literate, while nonscientists
might realize that science is more than the dry recitation of “facts” and “laws” and begin actively to appreciate it as an integral part of our culture. After all,
as Resnick’s comments suggest, we will get through
life on the basis of a complex of “naïve” theories
about how the world works.
G EOFFREY F. D AVIES
Department of Earth and Planetary Sciences
Washington University
St. Louis, Missouri 63130

Resnick provides an excellent brief account of
current work in cognitive psychology and its important implications for math and science education. As
she indicates, most cognitive psychologists view
knowledge as consisting of highly organized schemata into which new experiences are assimilated and
view the learner as actively constructing new knowledge. This view is consistent with the ideas that Piagetian theorists and educators have been propounding
for many years, although Resnick’s discussion is
rooted in the more detailed analysis of specific
knowledge and learning in specific content areas that
typifies the information-processing paradigm of
modern cognitive science.
Unfortunately, although Resnick may not have intended this, her article can be read as suggesting that
the self-constructed theories children bring to their
science classes are, on the whole, naïve and inappropriate views that must be replaced by more adequate
scientific conceptions and that may hinder students in
learning the latter. Although children undoubtedly do
bring some incorrect preconceptions to their science
classes, it should be emphasized that they also bring a
wealth of crucial mathematical and scientific intuitions (for example, basic conceptions of speed, causality, transitive relations, and so forth) that they have
constructed over the years and without which meaningful assimilation of the content of those classes
would be impossible. Thus, the fact that classroom
experiences are naturally assimilated into children’s
prior understandings is not so much a hindrance to
learning accurate science as a basic phenomenon of
cognition that makes learning possible at all and that
educators should use to maximum advantage.
D AVID M OSHMAN
Department of Educational Psychology,
University of Nebraska–Lincoln
Lincoln, Nebraska 68588

It is a pleasure to reply to letters such as Davies’
and Moshman’s because their comments provide
some of the elaboration and argument that were not
possible in my brief essay. I am especially intrigued
by Davies’ suggestion that the processes of reasoning
in the sciences and in more humanistic disciplines
may turn out to be more similar than is often supposed. Cognitive research in language understanding
and production is indeed suggesting that processes
that have much in common with qualitative analysis
in the sciences play a role in comprehending and
writing complex texts of various kinds. Nevertheless,
there is also evidence that the specific kinds of
knowledge that people have affects the form of their
reasoning. This means that, if reasoning can be
taught, it can probably only be done in the context of
specific domains of knowledge. Whether such domain-specific learning will in turn produce improved
reasoning and expression in other domains remains to
be seen, but I agree with Davies that there is room for
cautious optimism.
Moshman’s suggestion that children’s intuitions
and invented theories may be the very stuff out of
which scientific competence can be built raises a central question for a cognitive theory of learning. At
present, we do not know exactly what role invented
theories play in learning. We know only that such
inventions are virtually unavoidable and that invented
theories are sometimes in fundamental conflict with
scientific ones. We do not yet know much about the
cognitive processes involved in modifying one’s
theories or in building new ones. Nor do we know
whether typical invented theories are necessary steps
on the way to scientific ones or just the result of gaps
in experience and knowledge. We cannot say, therefore, exactly how invented theories should best be
treated in the classroom.
These are the kinds of questions that can be answered only by the kind of continuing research in
mathematical and scientific cognition that was advocated in my article.
L AUREN B. R ESNICK
Learning Research and Development Center
University of Pittsburgh
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15260

